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SCHOOL FEES IN PUBLIC EDUCATION-
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States, from its beginning, has promoted the 
ideal that education is important to the continuance of our 
society. 1 Thomas Jefferson stated: 
Every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the 
people alone. The people themselves therefore are the only safe 
depositories. And to render even them safe their minds must be 
improved to a certain degree. This indeed is not all that is 
necessary, though it be essentially necessary.2 
All states are required to establish and maintain a public 
school system and a majority are required by their 
constitutions to have a "free" educational system.3 A truly free 
education is still not a reality however, as many states allow 
1. See Augustus F. Hawkins, Becoming Preeminent in Education: America's 
Greatest Challen,.;e, 14 HARV. J.L. & PI.JB. PoL 'y 367, 371-72 (1991) (referring to the 
Land Ordinance Act of 1785 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which when 
passed under the Articles of Confederation "linked the drawing of property lines to 
inclusion of schools"). ld. at 372. The Northwest Ordinance explicitly stated that 
"religion, morality and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the 
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever by [sic] 
encouraged." ld. at 372 n.18 (citing David Tyack & Thomas James, Education for a 
Republic: Federal Influence on Public Schooling in the Nation's First Century, THIS 
CONSTITUTION Winter 1985, at 17.) (emphasis added). 
2. 3 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 254 (P. Ford ed., 1892), quoted in 
Patricia Jo Kendall, Public School Fees in Illinois: A Re-examination of 
Constitutional and Policy Questions, 1984 U. Ill. L. Rev. 99. 
3. The following state constitutional provisions mandate the establishment of a 
public education system; ALA. CONST. art. XIV, amend. 111, § 256; ALASKA CONST. 
art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IOWA CONE>'T. art. 
IX, § 12; KY. CONS!'. § 183; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONE>'T. art. VIII, pt. 1, 
§ 1; MAss. CONE>'T. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 
XI, § 2; N.H. CONE>"!'. pt. 2, art. 83; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; OR. CaNST. art. VIII, 
§ 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 68; WASH. CONE>"!'. art. IX, § 
2; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1, § 9. 
The following require some form of free public education or that no tuition be 
charged: ARK. CONST. art. 14, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5; CoLO. CaNST. art. IX, 
§ 2; CONN. CONE>'T. art. VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 
1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, para. 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. 
X, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1, § 6(b); MD. CONST. 
art. VIII, § 1; MICH. CONE>'T. art. VIII, § 2; MISS. CONE>"!'. art. VIII, § 201; Mo. 
CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(3); NEB. CONST. art. VII, §1; N.J. 
CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; 
N.C. CONST. IX, § 2(1); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 2, § 4; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, §1; 
S.C. CONST. art. XI, §3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; 
TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; W. VA. CaNST. art.XII, § 1; 
WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3. 
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fees for both academic and non-academic activities.4 These fees 
hinder the full participation of low-income children in the 
educational system. These children are denied the right to 
participate in school programs and activities because of their 
inability to pay the required fee. This is true even where fee 
waiver policies are purportedly available to ensure low income 
children an equal opportunity to participate. 
This paper will address the current federal and state law 
regarding the right to education when school fees are imposed. 
Part II will discuss education as a fundamental right under the 
federal constitution. Part III will address the different 
interpretations of free education under the state constitutions, 
and how different courts apply these interpretations. Part IV 
will review the policy objectives of a free education system and 
discuss alternatives under the current state programs. 
Additionally, current trends in state fee and fee waiver policies 
will be examined. This section will conclude by proposing that 
the best way to achieve the policy objectives in education is to 
abolish all fees in the public schools through free education 
clauses in state constitutions. 
II: THE RIGHT To FREE EDUCATION UNDER 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION. 
The right to an education is not explicitly protected in the 
federal constitution,5 and the Supreme Court has refused to 
recognize education as an implied fundamental right.6 
However, the Court has recognized the importance of education 
in our democratic system7 by declaring education to be an 
4. See Roger W. Hamm & Sandra Crosser, School Fees, 178 THE AMERICAN 
SCHOOL BOARD JoURNAL 29, (June 1991) (According to a survey of the 
Departments of Education in all fiO states and the District of Columbia, 34 states 
permit some type of student fees, including textbook fees, lab fees, class fees, 
activity fees, supplies and equipment, field trip, and participation fees for extra 
curricular activities). 
5. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 3fi (1973). 
6. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988). See also 
Suzanne McAlpine, Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools: Will Education Ever Be 
Deemed a Fundamental Right?, 10 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 629, 634 (1990). 
7. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (19fi4), stated: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures 
for education both demonstrate our recopnition of the importance of 
education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our 
most basic responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very 
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is the principal instrument in 
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important governmental interest.8 This section will describe 
the Court's shifting treatment of this interest in three leading 
education cases and will analyze how the Court's decisions 
apply to school fee cases. 
A. San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez. 
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,9 
the Supreme Court upheld the Texas school financing scheme 
against an equal protection claim. The parents, representing 
minority and poor residents in districts with low property tax 
bases, claimed that the system subjected poor students to a 
lower quality education. The system's reliance on local property 
taxes resulted in lower per pupil expenditure in poorer 
districts. 10 
The Court declined to apply a strict scrutiny standard of 
review, 11 holding that wealth was not a suspect classification, 
and that education was not a fundamental right adversely 
affected by the Texas scheme. 12 In determining that wealth 
was not a suspect class in this case, the Court inquired 
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later 
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. 
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a 
right which must be made available to all on equal terms. 
ld. at 492 (emphasis added). 
See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) ("We have recognized 'the 
public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic 
system of government . . . .'") 
8. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221. See also, Stuart Biegel, Reassessing the 
Applicability of Fundamental Rights Analysis: The Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Shaping of Educational Policy After Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 1078, 1086. 
9. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
10. ld. at 1. 
11. In reviewing state action under the equal protection clause of the 
Constitution, the Court generally uses a two tiered approach. The Court applies 
strict scrutiny to cases involving either a suspect class, such as race or gender, or 
a fundamental right, such as the right to interstate travel or the right to a 
criminal appeal. In order to pass constitutional muster under this standard the 
state action must be necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. In cases 
where no suspect classification is made and no fundam~ntal interest is involved, 
the Court will apply a more deferential rational basis review, which requires only 
that the state action bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. 
See McAlpine, supra note 6, at 631-32. 
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whether an inability to pay resulted in an "absolute deprivation 
of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that [educational] 
benefit."13 Two types of wealth classification cases have been 
held suspect: fees which deny indigent criminals an adequate 
trial or appeal, 14 and voting cases which deny free access to 
the ballot. 15 The Court found no definable class in Rodriguez 
which was absolutely deprived of an education by the Texas 
financing scheme. 16 In so holding, the Court left open the 
issue of whether wealth could be a suspect class in other 
education cases, such as those dealing with school fees. 17 
The Court further held that education was not a 
fundamental right. It reasoned that although education is 
important to society, this "does not determine whether it must 
be regarded as fundamental ... :ns The key factor in 
determining fundamentality is "whether there is a right to 
education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the 
Constitution."19 Education is neither.20 The Court reasoned 
that holding education to be a fundamental right would require 
the Court to become a "super-legislature.'121 The court would 
be forced to declare rights constitutionally protected without 
explicit or implicit authority.22 The Court conceded, however, 
that there might be some "identifiable quantum" of education 
guaranteed by the Constitution, but the Texas scheme met this 
requirement. 23 
The Court also emphasized the importance of state and 
local control of education, noting that education financing has 
13. !d. at 20. 
14. !d. at 21. 
15. !d. at 22. 
16. !d. at 22-25. 
17. The Court in a footnote stated: 
An educational financing system might be hypothesized, however, in which 
the analogy to the wealth discrimination cases would be considerably closer. 
If elementary and secondary education were made available by the State 
only to those able to pay a tuition assessed against each pupil there would 
be a clearly defined class of 'poor' people-definable in terms of their 
inability to pay the prescribed sum-who would be absolutely precluded 
from receiving an education. That case would present a far more compelling 
set of circumstances for judicial assistance . . . . 
!d. at 25 n.60. 
18. !d. at 30. 
19. !d. at 33-34. 
20. !d. at 35. 
21. !d. at 35. 
22. !d. at 31. 
23. !d. at 36-37 . 
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traditionally been a state function. 24 The Court then deferred 
to state legislatures to solve school financing woes, 
emphasizing the possibility of more than one constitutionally 
permissible solution.25 
Rodriguez represents the general rule, that in most cases 
the Court will examine the state educational financing schemes 
under a rational basis standard. The Court may apply strict 
scrutiny if it can be shown that children are being absolutely 
deprived of a basic education based on their inability to pay a 
fee. 26 
B. Plyler v. Doe. 
In Plyler v. Doe,27 the Supreme Court took a step toward 
acknowledging education as a fundamental right, striking down 
a statute denying illegal alien children the same free public 
education provided to citizens and legally admitted aliens. The 
Texas statute withheld state funds for the education of illegal 
alien children from local school districts and authorized the 
districts to deny these children enrollment.28 
The Court struck down the statute using an intermediate 
standard of review.29 Determining that the illegal alien 
children constituted a suspect classification, the Court focused 
24. !d. at 40. 
25. !d. at 42. The court also stressed how grave an effect an alternative ruling 
would have on states. "[I]t would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater 
potential impact on our federal system than the one now before us, in which we 
are urged to abrogate the systems of financing public education presently in 
existence in virtually every State." !d. at 44. 
26. !d. at 2fi n.60. See supra, note 16. 
The court had an opportunity to determine a school fee case prior to Rodriguez. 
In Johnson v. N.Y. Dept. of Ed., 409 U.S. 75 (1972) children were not allowed to 
participate in class if they had not paid the required textbook fee. The case 
however, was remanded to the district court when the school district voters elected 
to assess taxes to purchase books for indigent children to use. The Court has not 
specifically ruled on this type of case with the limited exceptions of Plyler v. Doe, 
and Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., which will be discussed in the next sections. 
27. 457 u.s. 202 (1982). 
28. !d. at 205, The statute also implicitly allowed the districts to charge tuition 
as an alternative to denying enrollment outright. The statute provides: "The board 
of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall admit into the 
public free schools of the district free of tuition all persons who are either citizens 
of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are over five and not over 
21 years of age .... " TEX. Enuc. CODE ANN. sec. 21.031 (Vernon supp. 1981). !d. 
at 206 n.l. 
29. The test used was whether the classification served an "important 
governmental objectives" and was "substantially related to achievement of those 
objectives." Biegel, supra note 8, at 1094. 
154 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1993 
on the children's inability to affect their "parent's conduct" or 
"their own status."30 The Court reasoned that "imposing 
disabilities on the . . . child is contrary to the basic concept of 
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to 
individual responsibility or wrongdoing."31 The Texas statute 
discriminated on the "basis of a legal characteristic over which 
the children [had] little control."32 · 
The Court conceded that education was not a "right" 
granted by the Constitution, but the Court underscored the 
importance of education to the preservation of our "democratic 
system of government."33 Finally, the Court emphasized the 
stigmatizing effect that withholding an education would have 
on these children. "By denying these children a basic education, 
we deny them the ability to live within the structure of our 
civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that 
they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of 
our Nation."34 
The analysis of Plyler could be used to successfully 
challenge school fees. Indigent children are no more responsible 
for their status than are illegal alien children. Nor do indigent 
children have the means to change or control the financial 
status of their parents. Thus, it could be concluded that any 
denial of an educational opportunity to indigent children based 
on their inability to pay a fee should be struck down under the 
same heightened standard used in Plyler.35 The Court, 
30. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220. 
31. ld., quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). 
32. ld. (the Court compared this case to cases involving illegitimacy such as 
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)). 
33. ld. at 221, (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 
(1963). The Court stated further: 
[E]ducation provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead 
economically productive lives to the benefit of all .... We cannot ignore 
the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are 
denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social 
order rests. 
[D]enial of education to some isolated group of children poses an affront to 
one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of 
governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on 
the basis of individual merit .... "[E]ducation prepares individuals to be 
self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society. 
ld. at 221-22 (citation omitted). 
34. ld. at 223. 
35. Biegel, supra note 8, at 1098-99. 
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however, refused to apply the heightened standard to school 
transportation fees in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools. 36 
C. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools. 
In Kadrmas, a student challenged the constitutionality of a 
North Dakota statute permitting non-reorganized school 
districts to charge a fee for door to door bus services. 37 The 
Court, refusing to extend Plyler to this case/8 applied a 
deferential rational basis analysis and upheld the statute.39 
The Court would not extend Plyler "beyond the 'unique 
circumstances' that provoked its 'unique confluence of theories 
and rationales."'40 Heightened scrutiny was held generally 
applicable only to "discriminatory classifications based on sex 
or illegitimacy."41 The Court explained that the child in this 
case was not denied services because of her parents' illegal 
conduct, but by their refusal to pay the user fee. 42 The Court 
concluded that the fee would neither create a "sub-class of 
illiterates,"43 nor leave the child without an alternative source 
of transportation.44 The state does not have a monopoly on 
transporting students, and in this case the child could and did 
find alternative transportation to school.45 The fact that the 
Kadrmas child was not prevented from attending school during 
the time she was denied bus service was crucial to the Court's 
decision. 46 
Kadrmas effectively precludes a challenge to school fees in 
the Supreme Court, unless a child is absolutely denied the 
right to an education and no alternative means for protecting 
that right are provided. Success, however, is unlikely 
considering the current atmosphere of the CourtY Thus, the 
36. 487 U.S. 450 (1988). Biegel applied in Kadrmas the heightened standard 
and reached the same result as the Court. Biegel, supra note 8, at 1098. 
37. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 41i0 (the statute required reorganized districts to 
provide the same services for free). 
38. ld. at 460. 
39. ld. at 461 (The statute will be upheld if "it bears a rational relation to a 
legitimate government objective."). 




44. Id. at 460. 
45. ld. at 460-61. The court did not examine the practical effect of the 
alternative but emphasized that an alternative did exist. 
46. Id. at 458. 
47. The trend currently in the Court disfavors the recognition of new 
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practical result is that states will be allowed to burden the 
"access of poor persons to an education" denying them an 
"equal opportunity" and hope for full participation in our 
society.48 
School fee challenges now must be made at the state 
level.49 Education clauses in state constitutions offer a strong 
theoretical basis for challenging school fees in the state 
courts.50 An examination of state constitutions and their 
treatment of school fees will be discussed in the next section. 
Ill. SCHOOL FEES AND THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS. 
The education articles of state constitutions articulate "the 
state's role in public education."51 Virtually all state 
constitutions require states to "establish some system of free 
public schools."52 The language of the constitutions varies, and 
state courts differ in their interpretations of what "free" 
means.53 The following sections will discuss the two analytical 
models used by state courts in school fee cases. Additionally, 
current fee policies will be reviewed, including types of fees 
charged and how they are treated under the differing analyses. 
A. Hamer v. Board of Education: 
An Historical Approach. 
In Hamer v. Board of Educ.,54 the Supreme Court of 
Illinois held that a textbook rental fee did not violate the "free 
schools" provision of the Illinois constitution. 55 The court 
interpreted the "free schools" clause according to the "natural 
"fundamental interests." See Biegel, supra note 8, at 1097. 
48. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 471 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
49. See Julie K. Underwood & William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: 
A New Wave of Reform, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'¥ 516, fi43 (1991). Federal 
challenges might still be possible if Congress were to condition receipt of federal 
education funding on a requirement that states equalize educational resources 
among school districts. See Hawkins, supra note 1, at 390. 
50. Cf Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform 
Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 308 (1991). 
51. Underwood, supra note 49, at 532. 
52. McUsic, supra note 50, at 311. See also Thomas J. Pepe & Alice L. Tufts, 
Commentary, Pay for Play: Fees {or Extra-Curricular Activities, 16 EDUC. L. RPTR. 
1013, 1026 (1984); Note, School Law-The Constitutional Mandate for Free Schools, 
1971 WIS. L. REV. 971, 973. 
53. See Underwood, supra note 49 at 529. 
54. 265 N.E.2d 616 (Ill. 1971). 
55. !d. at 622. 
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and popular meaning of the language used as it was 
understood at the time the constitution was adopted."56 Upon 
tracing the history of the free schools provision, the court 
concluded that the provision only required the furnishing of a 
"schoolhouse and teachers at public expense,"57 not 
textbooks. 58 
Courts using a Hamer-type analysis find the meaning of 
"free education" either "inherently or contextually 
ambiguous."59 These courts look to the intent of the "framers" 
to determine the scope of free education. 60 They look at the 
educational practices at the time the constitution was adopted 
to establish what was intended.61 
In applying this analysis, courts have generally allowed 
fees for textbooks and other educational materials.62 They are 
split, however, on course and activity fees. 63 In sum, courts 
using Hamer's historical approach are "unconcerned with 
whether an item is important to education."64 A fee may be 
56. ld. at 620. 
57. ld. 
58. ld. at 621. 
59. Patricia M. Harris, Student Fees in Public Schools: Defining the Scope of 
Education, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1401, 1405 (1987). A list of cases following the Hamer 
approach is given at id. at 1403 n.25. 
60. ld. at 1406. 
61. Kendall, supra note 2, at 103. 
62. See e.g., Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 264 S.E.2d 106 (1980) 
(upholding fees for fungible supplies and materials used in individual courses, 
locker rental, musical instrument rental and rental or purchase of gym uniforms.); 
Marshall v. School Dist. re #3 Morgan County, 553 P.2d 784 (1976) (absolving 
school districts of the responsibility to provide free textbooks to all students); Beck 
v. Board of Educ., 344 N.E.2d 440 (1976) (upholding fees for workbooks and other 
educational materials and supplies charged to parents financially able to pay 
them); Board of Educ. v. Sinclair, 222 N.W.2d 143 (1974) (permitting fees for 
textbooks and similar fees). 
The following items have been considered educational materials: magazine 
subscriptions, learning center supplies, file folders, paint, glue, chalk, pencils and 
marking pens, locks, towels, atlases, pamphlets, paperback books kept by the 
school, laboratory supplies, home economics supplies and industrial arts supplies. 
Kendall, supra note 2, at 108 n.55. 
Current trends suggest that Hamer could be used to justify fees for "secretarial 
services, school nurses, physical education equipment, desks, chairs, [and] library 
books .... " ld. at 112. 
63. Compare, Sneed, 264 S.E.2d at 109-110 (allowed fees for credit courses 
including art, typing, vocational education and science, some were required courses, 
others were elective) with, Sinclair, 222 N.W.2d at 48 (struck down fees for any 
course required or elective). See also Harris, supra note 59, at 1409. 
64. Kendall, supra note 2, at 105. 
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charged, regardless of an item's educational value, unless it 
was historically provided free. 65 
Commentators have three main criticisms of the Hamer 
analysis. First, the assertion that "free" is textually ambiguous 
is against the "weight of judicial authority. 'Free' is an absolute 
term rather than one of degree."66 The fact that different 
constitutions may have provisions describing the educational 
system does not render the term "free" ambiguous. "Free" 
means without cost. The additional requirements define the 
nature of that state's educational system. They do not affect 
what will be provided free by the state.67 
Second, critics claim that Hamer is not based on a reliable 
precedent. 68 Before 1970, no case had dealt with a school fees 
issue under a state constitutional challenge.69 The discussion 
of free schools in Segar v. Board of Education,70 relied on in 
Hamer, has been described as "dictum.'m According to these 
critics, any precedent before 1970 "supporting courts' decisions 
on either side is suspect."72 
Finally, critics argue that Hamer ignores the 
advancements made in education over the last century. 73 It is 
"inapposite to contemporary views about what constitutes an 
education.''74 This "historical approach freezes . . . education" 
and "eviscerates the inherent nature of education as 
progress.''75 These critics prefer to interpret free education 
under the state constitutions using a plain meaning 
65. ld. 
66. Harris, supra note 59, at 1407. 
67. Id. 1407-08. 
68. ld. 
69. ld.; Kendall, supra note 2, at 111. 
70. 148 N.E. 289 (Ill. 1925). 
71. Kendall, supra note 2, at 111 ("[T]he specific controversy before the court 
did not involve a constitutional mandate for free textbooks, but rather involved 
interpretation of the Free Textbook Act and the constitutionality of damage 
deposits."). 
72. Harris, supra note 59, at 1408. 
73. Kendall, supra note 2, at 113. 
74. Harris, supra note 59, at 1408. The author stated: 
Today, . . . more courses are offered in the course of a school year. A 
different text is usually required for each grade or level of study, and 
teaching methods and technological advancements result in a higher 
textbook replacement rate. These factors combine to create a much heavier 
financial burden on students today than students faced 100 years ago. 
ld. at 1408 n.67. 
75. Kendall, supra note 2, at 113. 
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approach. 76 This approach will be discussed in the next 
section. 
B. The Plain Meaning Approach: 
Paulson/Bond and Their Progeny 
The plain meaning approach was initially applied in 
Paulson v. Minidoka County Sch. Dist.,77 and Bond v. Ann 
Arbor Sch. Dist . . 78 Under this approach, courts look to the 
"plain ordinary meaning of the constitutional language .... "79 
Courts first determine if the constitutional language allows any 
fees.80 Where the constitution calls for "free" schools, the 
courts have interpreted "free" to mean "without cost or 
charge."81 Following this determination, the court then must 
determine "whether the activity or item subject to charge 
constitutes 'education."'82 In making this determination, the 
courts in Paulson and Bond have developed separate tests. 
These tests have been used together and separately to 
determine the scope of free education in subsequent school fee 
cases. 83 The following section will review these cases and 
describe the treatment of different types of fees using these 
analyses. 
1. Paulson v. Minidoka County School District. 
Paulson involved a challenge to a twenty-five dollar fee for 
school activities and a twenty-five dollar fee for textbooks. 
Paulson was denied a copy of his transcript, needed to enroll in 
the state university because he had failed to pay the fees. 84 
The Supreme Court of Idaho held that the high schools fell 
76. See, Harris, supra note 59, at 1411; Kendall, supra note 2, at 103. 
77. 463 P.2d 935 (Idaho 1970). 
78. 178 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. 1970). 
79. Kendall, supra note 2, at 102. 
80. ld. at 103. 
81. Bond, 178 N.W.2d at 487. 
82. ld. 
83. See, Kelley v. East Jackson Pub. Sch., 372 N.W.2d 638, 639 (1985) 
(applying both the "necessary elements of any school's activity" test and the 
"integral fundamental part of the educational process" test). But see Parsippany-
Troy Hills Educ. Ass'n, 457 A.2d 15, 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) (applying 
only the Bond integral test). 
For a list of other cases following the Bond-Paulson analysis, Harris, supra 
note 59, at 1403 n.25. 
84. Paulson, 463 P.2d at 936-37. 
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under the definition of "common schools" and were to be 
"free."85 First, the activity fee was held to constitute a charge 
on attendance contrary to the constitutional mandate for free 
schools.86 The court, however, would allow social and extra-
curricular activity fees to be charge if they "cover[ed] costs of 
such activities to be paid by students who wish to exercise the 
option to participate in them."87 Textbook fees were then held 
invalid by the court. The court found that textbooks were 
"necessary elements of any school's activity" and thus fell 
under the free school guarantee. 88 In making this 
determination, the court focused on the lack of control or choice 
the student has over the textbooks used.89 
2. Bond v. Ann Arbor School District. 
The Supreme Court of Michigan followed Paulson in Bond 
v. Ann Arbor Sch. Dist. 90 This case also involved a challenge 
to textbook and supply fees. 91 The court struck down the fees 
determining that "free" under the Michigan constitution meant 
"without cost or charge .... "92 The court then applied both 
the "necessary elements of any school's activity test" from 
Paulson, and an additional test, requiring anything that was 
an "integral fundamental part of the elementary and secondary 
education. . . " to be free. 93 The court concluded that 
textbooks and supplies fell into this category and were 
essential to the public school system. 94 
85. !d. at 937. 
86. ld. at 938. Idaho Const. art. IX § 1, states that "it shall be the duty of the 
legislature of Idaho to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough 
system of public, free common schools." 
87. Paulson, 463 P.2d at 938. 
88. ld. 
89. !d. at 939. The court stated: 
!d. 
[T]he student has no choice in the quality or quantity of textbooks he will 
use if he is to earn his education. He will use exactly the books, prescribed 
by the school authorities, that his classmates use; and no voluntary act of 
his can obviate the need for books nor lessen their expense. School books 
are, thus, indistinguishable from other fixed educational expense items such 
as school building maintenance or teachers' salaries. 
90. 178 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. 1970). 
91. !d. at 485. 
92. Id. at 487. Mich Const. art. VIII § 2 reads in part: "The legislature shall 
maintain and support a system of free public elementary and secondary schools as 
defined by law." 
93. !d. at 488. 
94. ld. 
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3. Validity of fees under Paulson/Bond 
Courts using the Paulson I Bond analysis focus on "what 
constitutes an education."95 These courts uniformly strike 
down fees for textbooks, finding them to be "indistinguishable 
from fixed educational expenses."96 Further, courts have 
generally struck down fees for required courses and the 
materials related to them.97 Extra-curricular fees, however, 
are allowed under this approach, because these activities "by 
definition fall outside a district's educational program."98 It is 
unclear, however, whether fees for elective courses are allowed 
under this test.99 
The plain meaning rule applied in Paulson and Bond is 
"more judicially sound."10° Courts adopting this rule are "not 
bound by the past and are better able to accommodate current 
educational needs .... "101 The rule is "clearly defined," 
succinct and manageable. 102 It ensures that a basic level of 
education is provided. 103 This analysis is an improvement 
over the historical approach because it is concerned with what 
presently constitutes an education rather than what did a 
hundred years ago. The rule, however, still fails to satisfy the 
policy objectives underlying free education even when fee 
waivers are available to indigent students. 
Part IV will consider the policy objectives of "free" 
education and how the current analyses conflict with these 
objectives. Fee waiver policies will be reviewed, concluding that 
they are an inadequate substitute for a totally free education. 
Finally, the paper will propose that the best approach to 
providing free public education is the approach taken in 
95. Harris, supra note 59, at 1410. 
96. ld. See also Kendall, supra note 2, at 105. 
97. Harris, supra note 59, at 1410. 
98. ld. 
99. Harris, supra note 59, at 1417 ("[C]ourts . . . split over what constitutes 
an education. They dispute whether an education includes required, credited 
elective, or noncredited elective courses and activities."). Harris points out that 
elective courses are problematic in that they are required due to credit hour 
requirements for graduation yet they are elective because students may choose 
from several alternatives. ld. at 1411 n. 84. SP.P. P..g., Norton v. Board. of Educ., 
553 P.2d 1277 (N.M. 1976) (holding required courses to be without charge, but 
reasonable fees may be charged for elective courses). 
100. Harris, supra note 59, at 1411. 
101. Kendall, supra note 2, at 106. See also Harris, supra note 59, at 1411. 
102. Note, supra note 52, 1971 WIS. L.REV. at 980. 
103. Harris, supra note 59, at 1411. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
.! 
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Hartzell v. Connell 104 striking down all fees regardless of 
type. 
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: 
To FEE OR NOT To FEE? 
"It is the mark of a moral and humane society to assist all 
human development to its fullest potential; it is a virtual 
economic necessity to properly educate and train all of society's 
members."105 Currently "[t]hirty-four states permit some type 
of student fees .... "106 School districts in these states have 
differing policies to deal with the non-payment of fees. The 
sanctions imposed on students for non-payment of fees include: 
denying enrollment in school; 107 withholding grades, 
transcript or diploma;108 denying enrollment or participation 
in specific classes or activities;109 denying access to textbooks 
or requiring students unable to pay to share with paying 
students;110 threats or humiliation;111 reducing grades;112 
104. 679 P.2d 35 (Cal. 1984). 
105. Hawkins, supra note 1, at 370. The author, quoting The Committee for 
Economic Development, stated: 
[T]his nation cannot continue to compete and prosper in the global arena 
when more than one-fifth of our children live in poverty and a third grow 
up in ignorance. And if the nation cannot compete, it cannot lead. If we 
continue to squander the talents of millions of our children, America will 
become a nation of limited human potential. It would be tragic if we allow 
this to happen. America must become a land of opportunity-for every 
child. 
Id. at 368. 
106. Hamm & Crosser, supra note 4, at 29. (drawing on the results from a 
survey of the departments of education in every state and the District of 
Columbia). 
107. Harris, supra note 59, at 1419. C{., Salazar v. Honig, 246 Cal. Rptr. 837, 
841 (Ct. App. 1988). 
108. Harris, supra note 59, at 1419. See also Canton v. Spokane Sch. Dist. #81, 
498 F.2d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1974). 
109. In re Distribution of Educational Books and Materials to Underprivileged 
Children in West Virginia, No. 280 at 3 (N.D. W.Va., June 17, 1977) (order 
enjoining school district from charging fees to needy school children for textbooks 
and other educational materials) [hereinafter In re Distribution]; Utah Issues 
Information Program, Inc., SCHOOL FEES: THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE 31 (1991) 
[hereinafter UTAH !SSlTES]. 
110. In re Distribution, at 3. 
111. Canton, 498 F.2d at 843; Nancy Hobbs, Poor Have Enough Obstacles to an 
Education, Says Group Fighting to Keep Them in School, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Feb. 
11, 1992, at A1; UTAH IS~'UES, supra note 109, at 20, 31. 
112. Canton, 498 F.2d at 843. 
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physical punishments;113 and requiring students to work off 
fee debt. 114 Some students forego taking classes requiring fees 
to avoid these types of sanctions. 115 The fees and the 
sanctions they perpetuate do not further the social, economic or 
political goals of education. They can also be psychologically 
damaging to students who must endure them. 
Education is intended to break down the social barriers 
between the classes and act as an equalizer,116 "promoting 
social cohesion."117 It "prepares students for active 
involvement in political affairs,"118 and fosters "those habits 
of open-mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for 
responsible citizens" and "an enlightened and effective public 
opinion."119 Education produces "well rounded-human being[s] 
that in and of themselves justify education."120 "Public 
Education helps produce an efficient labor force ... "121 by 
giving students the intellectual and communication skills and 
the practical training necessary to compete in the 
marketplace. 122 
Fees compromise these goals by denying "some students 
the benefits of full exposure to the academic variety, social 
skills and activities contemplated in achieving'' them. 123 Fee 
113. !d. 
114. Hobbs, supra note 111, at A1 (student required to do janitorial work to pay 
school fees); UTAH ISSUES, supra note 109, at 31 (student required to clean toilets 
to pay fees). 
115. UTAH ISSUES, supra note 109, at 20, 31. 
116. Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 35, 40 (quoting John T. Wickes, a delegate to the 
California Constitutional Convention, who said: "[F]or the man who has a liberal 
education, if he has no money, . . . he can stand in the presence of his fellow-
men with the stamp of divinity upon his brow ... ."). 
117. !d. at 52. 
118. ld. at 40. 
119. ld. at 41 (quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring)). 
Persons with higher educational attainment are more able and more likely to 
become involved in the political process and to influence the outcomes of those 
issues that affect them. Persons with lower levels of education not only are not as 
knowledgeable concerning political issues, and thus not as likely to be aware of 
matters affecting themselves, but also are less well informed about the entire 
political process and thus not as capable of expressing their views even when they 
are aware of relevant issues. Clearly, lack of schooling or lack of good schooling 
restricts one's ability to exercise political rights. Kendall, supra note 2, at 119 
n.123 (quoting J. Guthrie, G. Kleindorfer, H. Levin & R. Stout, Schools and 
Inequality 104-05 (1971). 
120. Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 48 (Mosk, J., concurring). 
121. Harris, supra note 59, at 1409. 
122. C{., Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 41. 
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programs weaken the "political, economic and social balance" 
by creating barriers to communication between different social 
groups. 124 They stigmatize students and keep those students 
who are unable to pay the fees in a lower class, taking away 
the means for them to achieve economic independence. 125 Fee 
waiver programs, designed to compensate for these problems, 
are grossly inadequate and only worsen the social stigma on 
low income children. 
A. Fee Waivers 
The purpose of fee waiver policies is to "ensure that no 
student is denied the opportunity to participate in a class or 
school sponsored or supported activity because of an inability to 
pay a fee." 126 The policies generally require some kind of 
notice to parents;127 confidentiality in the process to avoid 
embarrassing students and their parents;128 and an appeal if 
the waiver is denied. 129 The policies generally allow waivers 
for both curricular and extra-curricular fees. 130 Eligibility for 
waivers is usually determined according to the same family 
income guidelines used m the federal school lunch 
program. 131 However, some policies allow others falling 
124. ld. at 120. 
125. See id. at 119-22. 
126. UTAH ADMIN. R. R300-407-6A (1990). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-12-
103 (1988); BURKE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SUPERINTENDENT'S GUIDELINES FOR 
IMPLEMENTING POLICY ON WAIVER OF STUDENT FEES (hereinafter BURKE COUNTY 
SCHOOLS). 
127. UTAH ADMIN. R. R300-407-5C (1990) (requiring districts to ensure written 
notice to all parents or guardians of fee and fee waiver policies within a 
reasonable time before fees become due); BURKE COUNTY SCHOOLS § II (requiring 
minimal notice of waiver policy to be sent home with each student at or before the 
beginning of each term). See also Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 38 (in addition to fee-
waiver policy "[t]eachers and coaches are asked to inform their principals of any 
students . . . expected to participate ... " who do not.). 
128. BURKE COUNTY SCHOOLS § Ill. UTAH ADMIN. R. R300-407-6A(2-3) (1990) 
reads: 
The waiver policy shall include procedures to ensure that: 
* * * 
(2) the process for obtaining waivers or pursuing alternatives is 
administered fairly, objectively and without delay, and avoids stigma and 
unreasonable burdens on students and parents; 
(3) students who have been granted waivers or provisions in lieu of fee 
waivers are not treated differently from other students or identified to 
persons who do not need to know; 
129. UTAH ADMIN. R. R300-407A(8)(1990); BURKE COUNTY SCHOOLS § III. 
130. BURKE COUNTY SCHOOLS § IV; UTAH ADMIN. R. R300-407-1A (1990). 
131. BURKE COUNTY SCHOOLS § III; UTAH ADMIN. R. R300-407-6A(5)(a) (1990) 
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outside this category to qualify, 132 and some districts simply 
determine the eligibility for waivers on a case by case 
basis. 133 These policies appear to alleviate any inequality in 
access to education. However, because administration of the 
policies is left to local school administrators, they have not 
achieved the goal of alleviating the inequalities and in many 
cases have caused greater harm to students. 134 
When administration of fee waiver policies is left to the 
local districts, many times the policies are not implemented, or 
are inadequately implemented, 135resulting in severe long 
term harm to students and increases in societal costs. 136 
(inability to pay is presumed for those receiving public assistance or free school 
lunch). 
132. UTAH ADMIN. R. R300-407-6A(5)(b) (1990) (allows a case by case 
determination for those not on public assistance or school lunch who have 
extenuating circumstances limiting their ability to pay school fees). 
133. See Marshall, 553 P.2d at 785 (citing Colorado Constitution which requires 
school boards to provide books to indigent children without charge upon written 
statement of a teacher that the parents of such children are unable to pay); Sneed, 
264 S.E.2d at 110 (discussing practice of granting fee waivers on a case by case 
basis, in the absence of a uniform waiver policy or procedure). 
134. See Hobbs, supra note 111. 
135. See Salazar, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (districts failed to notify parents of fee 
waiver policy, and some districts refused application for the waiver). 
A Dec. 1991 survey of fee waiver policies in Utah revealed the following: 21 of 
41 districts failed to provide notice of waivers, 16 of 33 districts providing a policy 
stated the eligibility guidelines incorrectly, 14 districts provide no guarantee of 
confidentiality and 19 districts failed to ensure that the procedures did not create 
stigmas or unreasonable burdens on parents or students. In addition eight school 
districts in Utah authorized fees for students in grades six and below, although 
such fees are specifically prohibited by the Utah Constitution. UTAH ISSUES, supra 
note 106, at 38-40. 
The survey of parents revealed that students felt restricted in choosing classes 
and activities because of the fees. They were threatened with denial of grades or 
transcripts or actually denied these because they had not paid the school fee. 
Students who were automatically eligible under the Utah rules were denied 
waivers for all or some of the fees. ld. at 20, 33. 
The anecdotal information included in this report recorded many instances 
where parents were intimidated, badgered and threatened for not paying the school 
fees. It is clear from this survey that the Utah policy is far from being uniformly 
applied to all eligible students. ld. at 20-37. 
136. The Utah Issues survey revealed that some parents had to forgo paying 
rent, utilities or buying groceries in order to pay the required school fees, and in 
some cases the students simply dropped out of school rather than face the 
humiliation of not being able to pay the fees, or applying for a waiver. UTAH 
ISb1JES, supra note 109, at 44. 
Kendall has also argued that: 
[T]hese waivers do not adequately alleviate the psychological impact upon 
the indigent child. Any fee waiver procedure is a potentially degrading 
experience to the child or parent unable to pay the additional costs 
incumbent upon a "free" education. Children may feel singled out and 
'I 
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"Even the most efficiently administered procedure risks 
stigmatizing students who need a fee waiver."137 "[T]o a child 
or his parents who are unable to pay the additional fees ... 
any waiver procedure is a degrading experience," whether it is 
efficient or not. 138 
Besides being inadequately applied, the fee waiver policies 
are not comprehensive enough to cover all of the students who 
may be unable to pay. 139 Those who are not eligible for free 
school lunches or who have several children in school may be 
just as unable to pay fees as those who do receive waivers. 
Thus, the waiver policies do not alleviate the barriers to equal 
access to education for all children. Even if waiver programs 
were adequately administered, they are not adequate 
substitutes for "free" education, because they would not help 
those children outside the standard eligibility requirements, 
and they stigmatize the families receiving waivers regardless of 
the efficiency of the waiver program. 
B. Solutions 
It has been suggested that the best approach to the school 
fees problem is to "prohibit fees for all courses carrying credit 
toward graduation, including any textbooks and materials 
necessary to complete these course offerings," and provide fee 
waivers for extra-curricular fees. 140 This analysis takes into 
consideration the financial constraints on school districts, 141 
while "ensuring provision of a basic education."142 This 
analysis, however, does not alleviate the problems with fee 
waiver programs that were discussed above. Such an analysis 
fails to take into account the important role extra-curricular 
programs play in the educational scheme. 
Extra-curricular activities are "generally recognized as a 
fundamental ingredient of the educational process."143 They 
stigmatized by their peers. Furthermore, fee waiver procedures impose an 
administrative barrier many may simply prefer not to cross. 
Kendall, supra note 2, at 122. 
137. Harris, supra note 59, at 1420. See also Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 44. 
138. Granger v. Cascade County Sch. Dist. No.1, 499 P.2d 780, 786 (Mont. 
1972). 
139. See Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 52 ("[T]he waiver is available only to those 
students who meet a specified standard of need."). 
140. Harris, supra note 59, at 1420-21. 
141. !d. 
142. !d. at 1411. 
143. Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 42 (citations omitted). 
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have become so "interwoven with ... curricular subjects" that 
"it is impossible to draw a clear-cut line of demarcation 
between them."144 They teach students the important 
principles of 'justice, fair play and good citizenship."145 These 
activities are generally sponsored by the schools, and school 
personnel supervise the students and handle preparations. 146 
They "form an integral and vital part of the educational 
program."147 Charging a fee for these activities creates an 
"attitude of exclusion" which would defeat the goals of public 
education. 148 
A better policy is to interpret the term "free" in its 
broadest sense and prohibit all fees in the public schools. The 
Supreme Court of California took this approach in Hartzell v. 
Connell. 149 The court, in this case, faced a challenge to extra-
curricular activity fees. 150 Interpreting the California 
Constitution according to the Bond test, 151 the court struck 
down the extra-curricular fees finding that they were an 
"integral component of public education."152 The court 
reasoned that the importance of extra-curricular activities had 
been found in a variety of other contexts, including: 
desegregation cases, teacher assignment cases, educational 
expenditure cases, and cases determining the scope of school-
related tort liability.153 
144. Id. at 42 n.12 (citation omitted). 
145. !d. at 42 (quoting McGrath v. Burkhard, 280 P.2d 864 (Cal. 1955)). 
146. !d. at 38. 
14 7. !d. at 43 (citation omitted). 
148. Pepe & Tufts, supra note 52, at 1015. 
149. 679 P.2d 35 (Cal. 1984). 
150. Id. at 36. 
151. !d. at 38-39. The court first noted that "[t]he California Constitution 
requires the Legislature to 'provide for a system of common schools by which a 
free school shall be kept up and supported in each district ... .' (Cal. Const., art. 
IX, § .5)" Id. at 38. It then went on to apply the Bond approach which holds that 
the free school guarantee extends to all activities which constitute an "integral 
fundamental part of the elementary and secondary education" or which amount to 
"necessary elements of any school's activity." Id. at 39 (quoting Bond v. Ann Arbor 
Sch. Dist., 178 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. 1970). 
152. !d. at 42. The court quoting JOHNSON & FAUNCE, STUDENT ACTIVITIES IN 
SECONDARY SCHOOLS 6-7 (19.52), stated: 
A concept which finds general acceptance today is that which identifies the 
curriculum with the experiences of the pupil. If the fundamental task of the 
school is to prepare children for life, the curriculum must be as wide as life 
itself. It should be thought of as comprising all the activities and 
experiences afforded by the community through the school . . .. 
!d. at 42 n.12. 
1.53. !d. at 42-43. 
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The court rejected the Paulson approach, determining that 
its focus on whether an activity was offered for credit was 
insufficient to "ensure compliance with California's free school 
guarantee."154 This approach, the court noted, would allow a 
fee to be charged for a non-credit program with "identical 
content-and equal value" as a program for which no fee is 
charged. 155 
Finally, the court held that the available fee-waiver 
provision did not meet the constitutional requirement of "free" 
schools. 156 The court stated: 
The free school guarantee reflects the people's judgment that a 
child's public education is too important to be left to the budgetary 
circumstances and decisions of individual families. It makes no 
distinction between needy and nonneedy families. Individual 
families, needy or not, may value education more or less depending 
upon conflicting budget priorities .... "[l]f left to their own unaided 
efforts, a great majority of the people will fail through want of 
means to properly educate their children; another class, with means 
at command, will fail through want of interest. The people then, can 
be educated only by a system of Free Schools, supported by taxation, 
and controlled directly by the people." 157 
The court recognized the limitations on funding faced by school 
districts, but concluded that "financial hardship [was] no 
defense to a violation of the free school guarantee."158 
In sum the court concluded that "access to public education 
is a right enjoyed by all-not a commodity for sale. Educational 
opportunities must be provided to all students without regard 
to their families' ability or willingness to pay fees or request 
special waivers."159 And, solutions to the funding difficulties 
"must be found elsewhere-for example, through the political 
process."160 All states should follow California's lead, as it 
implements the soundest approach to the problem of school fees 
and achieves the educational goals of "Free Schools." 
154. ld. at 41. 
155. !d. 
156. ld. at 44. 
157. Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 43 (citation omitted). 
158. !d. at 44. 
159. !d. 
160. ld. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Challenges to school fees brought in federal courts will 
likely be unsuccessful. The best forum for changes in school fee 
policies is at the state level. Most states provide for free 
education in their constitutions. Those that do not should adopt 
free school guarantees, to ensure that all children in their 
states are provided with the education they need to become 
productive citizens. Although different approaches are taken to 
the interpretation of "free school" guarantees, the best 
approach is that taken by the California court in Hartzell. It 
achieves the goals of public education and ensures that 
children of needy families are not excluded or stigmatized by 
ineffective fee waiver policies. Although this approach may 
create financial hardships for school districts, or force them to 
make tough choices regarding what kinds of extra-curricular 
programs to offer, the alternative damage to students created 
by ineffective fee policies outweigh the need for some of these 
programs. "If the schools' existence benefits the entire 
community, then their complete maintenance and functioning 
should be the responsibility of that community."161 A 
community should provide what it can to all children rather 
than exclude some solely because they are unable to pay. 
Holly J. Foster 
161. Note, supra note 52, at 981 (emphasis added). 
